

SECTION I, NARRATIVE

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS FROM 18 SEPTEMBER TO 31 OCTOBER

48. At the staff meeting on 18 September General Adcock, G-4, stated that Liberty Ships were unloading at ten dock berths at MARSEILLES, operations there being three days ahead of original Navy estimates. He estimated that by 1 October ten divisions could be supplied through railheads in the DIJON area and announced plans for extending the usable railway net beyond DIJON.* He added that the construction of a gasoline pipe line was being pushed, with four hundred miles of pipe already unloaded in FRANCE. Flatcars were being rounded up for movement of the 5 DB, (5th Armored Division, French) scheduled for debarkation at MARSEILLES, and civilian supplies were going ashore at TOULON.

49. During the period 15-20 September the Seventh Army and Army "B" (First French Army) were engaged in regrouping operations, placing the VI Corps (US) on the left and the French forces on the right. This action was in accordance with the desire of SCAEF to facilitate transfer of divisions between the Third Army and Sixth Army Group without intermixing French and American units. Finding resistance light except in the defense of the BELFORT region; it was possible to combine these regrouping movements with an advance by the VI Corps on the left. The 45th Division, upon relief by French units, was brought up on the left of the 36th Division. During his advance to the North, General Patch was cognizant of the need for ultimate disposal of his VI Corps on the left, and it might appear that he could have avoided delay incident to regrouping operations by early dispositions and the assignment of boundaries and routes with that end in view. However his principal concern was a race to the North to cut off the escape of as many of the enemy as possible. The U.S. VI Corps had established a considerable lead to the North while the French Army "B" was engaged in the capture of MARSEILLES and TOULON. Thus it was logical for General Patch to employ it for the spearhead of pursuit without much regard to choice of flank and boundaries. Actually the regrouping operations did not cause substantial delay because any considerable advance in strength was forced to wait for the establishment of adequate lines of communication.

50. On 19 September, General Barr returned to the headquarters and resumed his duties as Chief of Staff.

51. On this same date a conference was held at the headquarters regarding the early release of landing craft for use in other theaters. In attendance were considerable representations from SHAEF, AFHQ, NATOUSA, Commander in Chief (British) of Naval Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, U.S. Navy and Seventh Army. It was brought out that the originally scheduled build-up

* Actually by 1 October the military railway service was supplying the bulk of the essential current needs of ten divisions plus corps, army and army group units, and the long motor hauls from base depots were no longer necessary. However, neither the build up of the usual reserves at the front nor the supply of ammunition and gasoline for normal sustained attack were possible until considerably later.

for the DRAGOON operation would not be complete until D plus 60, (15 October), and that a period of 20 days was needed for overhaul of landing craft prior to dispatch for new operations. Requirements for other possible operations and the minimum normal requirements of the Mediterranean Theater were also considered. After some study it appeared probable that by careful planning all essential needs could be met and the bulk of the landing craft released by 10 October. One battalion of DUKWS (250 to 280 amphibious trucks) was reserved for use at the ports and another battalion for crossings of the RHINE.

52. On 20 September, with appropriate ceremony, General Devers presented decorations to personnel of the command as follows. (29) In each instance the awards were made for services performed in prior assignments.

LEGION OF MERIT

Colonel William R. Watson, IGD
Colonel Louis T. Heath, GSC
M/Sgt. Lewis H. Grand, Hq. Co.

MOST EXCELLENT ORDER OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE


Captain Oliver L. Gentry, GSC

53. On this same date a revised Manning Table was issued providing for a total of 199 Officers and 339 Enlisted Men in the General and Special Staff Groups. (30)

54. On 23 September, Staff Memorandum No. 9 was issued covering the general principles of staff procedure to be followed in the headquarters. Speed, accuracy and conciseness were stressed. (31)

55. On this same date General Nugent, A-3, 9th Air Force, attended the staff conference at which the need of the Sixth Army Group for adequate air support was discussed. General Nugent recommended the use of medium rather than heavy bombers for direct support. He said that a few of the mediums were already available for the purpose and that he would seek firm decisions as to what additional support could be furnished.

56. As has been noted, General Devers was anxious to stage a powerful offensive drive as early as possible but was short of troops, having only three Corps on an extended front. Accordingly on 22 September he visited SHAEF Advance Headquarters near GRANVILLE for conference on this problem. The most expeditious means of augmenting the Sixth Army Group was to assign to it the XV Corps which was already in the line on its immediate left as part of the Third Army of the Twelfth Army Group. On 23 and 24 September Colonels Vittrup and Bender of G-3 and Lieutenant Colonel Little of G-4, visited Headquarters Seventh Army at VESOUL and Headquarters XV Corps at CHARMES to gain the information needed for more specific recommendations for this plan. Representatives from Seventh Army accompanied them to XV Corps. They recommended favorably, estimating that supply of the XV Corps could be taken over by 1 October and that operational control could be assumed earlier if desired, since the necessary corps troops and signal communications were available. The new boundary recommended was LUNEVILLE-BARRBURG and thence along the existing Sixth Army Group left boundary. The



CONFERENCE AT LYON REGARDING LANDING CRAFT

XV Corps included the 79th Infantry Division, U.S., and the 2nd DB (French Armored Division).

57. Recommendations based generally on the above were forwarded by Headquarters Sixth Army Group to SHAEF 25 September. (32) However, passage of maintenance as well as operational control effective 28 September was recommended as well as the transfer to Sixth Army Group at earliest practicable date of the 44th or other Infantry Division then available on the continent. After the dispatch of these recommendations, other proposals, two day en route, were received from SHAEF. They included the use of III Corps, 95th Division and 2nd French Armored Division. (33) After due consideration a reply was dispatched adhering to the recommendations already forwarded for transfer of the XV Corps as first preference. (34)

58. On 27 September there was received from SHAEF the following directive covering the augmentation, missions and boundary for the Sixth Army Group:

FROM: SHAEF FWD SIGNED EISENHOWER

TO : SIXTH ARMY GROUP FOR ACTION

26 September 1944

1. Study of all factors leads to the conclusion that best solution will be for XV Corps composed of its Headquarters, 79 Infantry Division, 2 French Armored Division and currently assigned and attached Corps supporting combat and service troops to pass from command of Twelfth Army Group to Sixth Army Group, effective 0001A hours 29 Sept. Twelfth Army Group will report transferred units.

2. Subject to adjustment in detail by mutual agreement of army groups, boundary between army groups CHAUMONT-LUNEVILLE-SAARBURG-LANDAU-HEIDELBERG all to Sixth Army Group.

3. Mission of Sixth Army Group:

(a). To protect Southern flank of Twelfth Army Group. This will initially entail securing area LUNEVILLE.

(b). To destroy the enemy in zone west of RHINE, secure crossings over the RHINE and breach the SIEGFRIED line.

4. The responsibility for keeping Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group fully informed of his dispositions and of all developments of operations will be that of the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group. Seventh Army will be similarly instructed to keep Third Army informed by direct liaison.

5. 1 further Infantry Division will be assigned to Sixth Army Group by CG, Twelfth Army Group. The move of this Division will be given lower priority to other moves presently contemplated by CG, Twelfth Army Group for reinforcing center and left of his sector. Twelfth Army Group will report the Division selected and the effective date of transfer.

6. It is the intention that there will be no further diversion of Divisions from Troop List of Twelfth Army Group beyond the 2 US Divisions and 1 French Division mentioned above and the 3 US Divisions in CU 42 and CU 43 that will be diverted in October to MARSEILLES.

7. A cable dealing with Service Units requested in para 2 of reference cable and those previously requested in list submitted by ADCOCK follows.

59. It may be recalled that on 12 September when General Jenkins conferred with General Frederick commanding the First Airborne Task Force the latter expressed a strong preference for operating directly under Headquarters Sixth Army Group rather than the Commanding General Communications Zone. On 29 September Operational Memorandum No. 2 was issued relieving the First Airborne Task Force and all its attachments from assignment to Seventh Army and establishing it as a separate command directly under Headquarters Sixth Army Group. Boundaries were assigned as well as the mission of protecting the right (East) flank along the Franco-Italian frontier within its zone of action. (35)

60. Plans for employment of Sixth Army Group, augmented, had been under study for some time and were crystallized in Letter of Instruction Number One dated at Headquarters Sixth Army Group 26 September 1944. Actual publication was delayed until 29 September, following receipt of the directive from SHAEF quoted in paragraph 58. Letter of Instructions Number One was addressed to Seventh Army, First French Army and First Airborne Task Force. It was prepared in the form of a brief field order. Paragraph 2a is quoted as follows:


2. a. Sixth Army Group passes XV Corps, composed as above, to command of Seventh Army effective 0001 A hours 29 September, continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in its zone of action west of the Rhine, seizes bridgeheads across the Rhine and breaches the Siegfried Line. The Sixth Army Group will protect South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

Seventh Army objectives included the LUNEVILLE area and STRASBOURG. Those for the First French Army included the BELFORT GAP, MULHOUSE and COLMAR. The First Airborne Task Force was assigned protection of the right (east) flank along the Franco-Italian border. Air organization and support were covered in an enclosed letter addressed to the units concerned. A complete copy of Letter of Instructions Number One is included as Document Number 30. (36)

61. There is inserted in the history at this point a photograph of the Situation Map taken 29 September. A series of such photographs will be used and it may be of value at this point to include some comments applicable to the series.

- a. The maintenance of situation maps in the War Room was primarily a G-3 function but G-2 posted a limited amount of enemy information on the same maps.

- b. The white string shows the latest verified front line. The



29 SEP 1964

dark string shows the front line of the preceding day.

c. G-2 used arrows to indicate counter-attacks. On the 17 and 29 September maps they also used a line of arrows to indicate the Maginot Line West of the RHINE.

d. Where map scales are shown they apply only to the photograph on which they appear.

e. The date and time indicated on the photographs indicates when the photographs were taken and, very generally speaking, represents the actual situation on the preceding day as verified by official reports. This does not mean that all information on the map was a day old. First information of advances was usually received within a very few hours through reports from Air-Ground Liaison and these were promptly posted on the map by means of pins. However, it was the practice to defer movement of the string representing the front line until the official situation report was received from the army concerned. It was usually the case that some portions of the map were more nearly up to the hour than others so that it would have been untrue to claim that the map showed the situation on the entire front at a specified date and hour. For this reason it was considered best to indicate on the photograph the date, and sometimes the hour, it was photographed and the reader should bear in mind the time lag which may run as high as 24 hours.

f. These photographs are the principal means by which this history presents the development of operations and the location of units. More detailed information is available in the series of daily Redline radio dispatches to General Eisenhower. These are available in the permanent files of the Adjutant General, Sixth Army Group which will, at the proper time, be transmitted to The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. with the permanent records of the headquarters. The G-2 and G-3 "Reports after Action" contain additional data on operations as will the histories of the armies and their included units.

62. With a supply line extending from coastal points some five hundred miles forward to the armies, the need for adequate railway transportation was urgent and it may be of interest to review briefly the situation up to this time. Southeastern FRANCE was served by a rail net adequate for normal requirements in peace. The German retreat was so precipitate that time and means were lacking for the complete destruction of railways as was brought to a fine art in ITALY. The many railway bridges, however, were practically all destroyed and there were numerous blocks caused by the strafing and destruction of enemy trains. One such block, some eighteen miles long, included in its wreckage guns and other items so heavy that no available wrecking equipment could clear them from the tracks and it was necessary to lay a new track to by-pass the block.


63. Use of the railways on a small scale was initiated by Seventh Army units as early as D plus 3 (18 August). Railway traffic was progressively extended both in mileage and tonnage through the combined efforts of Army Engineers, the Military Railway Service, French railway organizations and civilians. In the early stages when long continuous rail lines were not yet in operation, much freight was moved by a combination of rail and motor shuttling, the motors bridging the rail gaps. This system required coordin-


ation between rail and motor transportation units as well as considerable rehandling of cargo, but it did effect an urgently needed saving in gasoline and reduction in the length of truck haul. The rail routes followed were not always the most direct. It was rather a matter of study and reconnaissance of the rail net as a whole to see if blown bridges or other blocks could be detoured. A careful study of bridge damage was made in order that initial effort could be concentrated on those bridges whose repair would most quickly provide continuous usable routes from ports to railheads. At the same time selection was made of the more direct high capacity lines that would ultimately prove of greatest value and high priority was assigned their rehabilitation. First priority was accorded the line on the East bank of the RHONE between MARSEILLES and DIJON and East from DIJON through DOLE to BESANCON and MONTBELIARD.

64. Many of the bridge repair jobs were major undertakings. As an example, the railway bridge at SISTERON consisted of fourteen masonry arch spans on sixty feet centers. One pier and the two adjacent spans were destroyed as well as a single span at one end of the bridge. Height of rail above stream bed at the destroyed pier was ninety-one feet. In addition, one of the remaining arches was badly cracked and weakened. Reconstruction by elements of the 1st Battalion, 40th Engineer Combat Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel George W. Prichard, CE, was commenced 2 September and completed nineteen days later, Bailey truss material was used for pier and spans. The weakened arch was reenforced with steel I beams.


65. The original plans for phasing in the Military Railway Service headquarters and operating units became inadequate when the advance ran away from the time-tables and thus called for extensive use of railways much earlier than had been expected. By General Devers' direction the movement of elements of the Military Railway Service to Southern FRANCE was set forward. Such changes require extra transportation and the revision of original schedules. In this case some extra transport, both air and water, was made available. Certain railway operating units were brought in thirty days earlier than scheduled and others fifteen days earlier. Brigadier General Carl R. Gray, Jr., Director General, Military Railway Service, moved from ROME to LYON on 14 September and established his headquarters in LYON the same date. Such celerity of action was made possible by the fact that General Devers was still Commanding General NATOUSA and Deputy SACMED.

66. On 2 October General Gray stated that the railways were operating to DIJON, BESANCON and beyond to within forty miles of VITTEL, and were handling freight at the rate of 550 tons 500 miles per day. This is a railway official's method of expressing ton-mile performance on a 500 mile haul. This would be 550 times 500 or 275,000 ton-miles per day. Since it required about six days to cover the 500 miles, the freight actually travelled only about 83 miles per day. To find the tonnage that was moved 83 miles each day we divide the ton-mile figure of 275,000 by 83 with resulting quotient of 3,313 tons. This compares closely with G-4's record of the combined shipments of 3,356 tons actually delivered at railheads for the First French and Seventh Armies on 2 October. Increased capacity raised the average daily shipments for October to the figure of 5,690 tons. The difference between this figure and those in paragraph 1e of the G-4 "After Action" report is explained by the fact that one deals in actual shipments and the other in allocations. At the daily staff conference 3 October Colonel Wilson, Deputy Acting Chief of Staff, G-4 for supply, stated that in general






DIA - DIVISION INFANTRY ALGERIAN
 DIC - DIVISION INFANTRY COLONIAL
 DIM - DIVISION INFANTRY MOROCCAIN
 DB - DIVISION BLINDEE (ARMORED)
 DBC - DEMI BRIGADE COLONIAL
 DMH - DIVISION MARCHE INFANTRY
 DMH - DIVISION MOROCCAIN MOUNTAIN
 RTA - REGIMENT TIRAILLEURS ALGERIAN
 RTM - REGIMENT TIRAILLEURS MOROCCAIN
 RTS - REGIMENT TIRAILLEURS SENEGLAIS
 RTT - REGIMENT TIRAILLEURS TUNISIAN
 SSF - SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE
 CCA - CCB - COMBAT COMMAND A OR B



CIL - ITALIAN INFANTRY UNITS
 BERS - BERSAGLIERI DIVISION
 CARP - CARPATHIAN DIVISION
 NEMBO - ITALIAN INFANTRY DIVISION
 SA - SOUTH AFRICAN DIVISION
 CDN - CANADIAN DIVISION
 IND - INDIAN DIVISION
 TF - TASK FORCE



C-4 Situation Map including railways (Railways posted to 16 October 1944)



B

HEADQUARTERS at VITTEL, FRANCE

there were plenty of supplies at MARSEILLES but shortages at the front, and that a complete round trip for supply trains required twelve days as compared with the ten days previously estimated. By about 10 October rail capacity was increased to the extent that the armies could shift from a hand to mouth consumption of artillery ammunition and begin the slow accumulation of forward reserves. It required nearly one month to build these up to the level required for preparation and support of a full scale attack. (37) It is considered that the Military Railway organization performed an outstanding job considering their limitations as to units, personnel and means, and that they would have built up rail capacity more rapidly could they have been reinforced by all the additional railway units they requested.

67. The situation emphasized the importance of flexibility in logistical planning to permit prompt employment of all needed units and means within reach on an emergency basis. This would enable the commander to take full advantage of an unexpectedly rapid advance, by providing to the absolute maximum possible degree, adequate and uninterrupted supply regardless of the length of supply lines and the difficulties encountered. It is true that supply for long distances by motor transportation is uneconomical and that there are limits beyond which it will not work at all. However, 500 miles is by no means the practicable limit, and if the DRAGOON operation could be replanned with benefit of its experience it is a practical certainty that we would find provision for the emergency use of much more motor transport. Then instead of being definitely halted for lack of indispensable supplies, the splendid advance of DRAGOON forces could have continued through October, breaching the VOSGES barrier with less cost in lives and time, and gaining tactical advantages of great importance.

68. During the period 3-6 October the major portion of the Headquarters moved 209 miles from LYON North to VITTEL, a small resort community about 25 miles West of EPINAL. Trains for enlisted men were dispatched on 3 October and on 5 October. After considerable delay and rerouting, troops detrained at VESOUL and were shuttled to VITTEL by truck. Motor convoys for officers were dispatched on 4 and 5 October. Baggage was moved partly by rail and partly by motor. The headquarters closed at LYON on 5 October at 0001 hours and opened at VITTEL on the same date at the same hour. (38)

69. General Devers had gone forward to Seventh Army Command Post during the latter part of September. A special radio circuit was installed by the Sixth Army Group Signal Officer to keep the general in close touch with his headquarters at LYON without increasing the load on Seventh Army communications. At VITTEL the majority of the headquarters was housed in the Hotel L'Ermitage, the remainder occupying other hotels and villas nearby.

70. The move from LYON to VITTEL was the first in which the headquarters had been on a full operating basis at both old and new locations and this posed new problems in signal communications. The load on facilities for electrical transmission was continuous and had reached an average volume of 85,000 words per day exclusive of voice transmission. Of this total about 60,000 words required encoding or decoding for security. The equipment available to the Signal Officer was not sufficient to provide duplicate installations at old and new locations to handle traffic in such volume and the method of dismantling, packing for shipment, shipping, unpacking and installing this delicate and intricate equipment was altogether too slow to meet the requirement for uninterrupted signal communications in adequate

volume. Furthermore such methods always result in breakage or loss of parts many of which are irreplaceable except after prolonged delay.


71. The problem was solved by installation of the bulk of the equipment in several large vans provided with heat, lights and ventilating equipment and suitably lined for insulation against cold and for sound absorption. These vans followed the general design successfully used by the Fifth Army in ITALY with such improvements as were found practicable. Technical description of the installations was prepared for information of the Chief Signal Officer, U.S. Army. One automatic radio van and one manual radio van were completed and in operation at LYON until 2400 hours 4 October. Then after a move of 209 miles the manual radio van was in operation at VITTEL by 2400 hours 5 October. The automatic radio installation provided circuits to AFHQ by 1200 hours 6 October and to SHAEF by 1800 hours 7 October. In addition, one 180 line telephone switchboard van, one landline teletype van and one cipher van were completed and went into initial operation at VITTEL when the headquarters opened there 5 October. The equipment was not damaged in transit and the saving in time for installation of telephone facilities was estimated as about three days. To complete the entire communications van project, one radio teletype van, two additional 180 line switchboard vans and one 80 line switchboard van were under construction at LYON.

72. When the transfer of XV Corps from the Twelfth to the Sixth Army Group was arranged, it was also requested that the supporting and service units then assisting XV Corps likewise be placed under the operational control of Sixth Army Group. In general, Sixth Army Group was inadequately provided with supporting and service units so that the transfers requested appeared the only means of continuing the support and services required by XV Corps.

73. On 3 October, however, there was received from SHAEF a message giving in detail the transferred supporting and service units, but providing that a number of the most essential units including all 4.5 inch, 8 inch and 240 mm (10 inch) heavy field artillery were to be only temporarily attached to Sixth Army Group and later reassigned by Twelfth Army Group, details to be arranged by agreement between the army groups concerned. (39)

74. The following day, General Jenkins, G-3, went to Headquarters Twelfth Army Group at VERDUN for conference on this matter at about the same time General Devers was attending conferences at SHAEF. General Devers believed it impracticable to secure a reversal of SHAEF's basic decision but there remained a chance of salvaging part of the loss by mutual agreement with Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, commanding the Twelfth Army Group. Accordingly on 7 October General Devers sent a message to General Bradley in which he cited the urgent need of Sixth Army Group for continued support of at least part of the units concerned including certain units of heavy field artillery. (41) On 10 October a reply was received from General Bradley agreeing to the retention by Sixth Army Group of the 999 FA Battalion, 8 inch Howitzer, the 772 FA Battalion, 4.5 inch gun, together with an Engineer light pontoon company and a group headquarters and headquarters battery, antiaircraft. The reply further requested that, except as listed above, the units concerned be returned to operational control of Twelfth Army Group effective 15 October. (42)

(See Reverse Side)



HIGH SPEED RADIO TERMINAL VAN

PURPOSE

The purpose of this installation is to provide a mobile high speed radio terminal complete enough to handle two high speed radio circuits simultaneously.

Operational equipment was conveniently arranged along each side of the van. In the forward part of the van are five slip reading positions. The diversity receiving bays are centrally mounted on the right side with the power supplies at the base of the receivers.

The two operating positions are at the rear of the van, one on the left and the other on the right. Each position has two means of recording. An anti-capacity switch is mounted on the right end of each operating table and enables the operator to switch to either the Boshme ink recorder or the Waters Conley recorder. A radio receiver BC 342 was installed at each operating position for the purpose of monitoring the transmissions. Antennas used for diversity receiving are spaced doublets cut for a half wave at 7 megacycles. The spacing between antennas is arranged to be approximately 3 wave lengths, more or less depending on availability of space. Each antenna serves two receivers.

(See ~~Reverse~~ Side)



LARGE MANUAL OPERATING VAN (10 TON)

PURPOSE

The function of this van is to provide a mobile radio control central of twelve manual operating positions sufficiently self contained to require only control lines and a source of single phase 110 volt AC power for operation.


NOTES PERTAINING TO THE VEHICLE ITSELF

The van selected was a standard 10 ton semi-trailer. The overall inside dimensions are: length 20 feet, width 7 feet, and height 6 feet 9 inches.

A certain amount of finishing work was done on the interior concurrent with the mounting of operational equipment. The two side walls, front, rear doors, and ceiling were weather insulated with 1/2 inch celotex. All of the seams were covered with 2 inch, half round moulding. Aside from being a good weather insulator, the celotex proved to be an efficient sound deadner, and also an excellent means of making the van dust proof.

Lumiline lighting was used, and was found to be far superior to the conventional bulb type of lighting. The soft diffused light is definitely an asset to efficient operations.

A ventilating blower from an SCR 299 was mounted inside on the front wall. Two Electromode type heaters of the 1-1/2 kilowatt variety were mounted in the back corners near the doors. The heaters proved adequate in the coldest weather. During hot weather the fan portions of the heaters can be run to further the circulation of air.



THREE POSITION TC-10 TELEPHONE CENTRAL OFFICE SET
(See Reverse Side)

THREE POSITION TC-10 TELEPHONE CENTRAL OFFICE SET

This photograph depicts the mounting of the BD-110A switchboard in the trailers.

On the front inside wall of the van, excluded from view by the partition shown, is mounted an RA-36E Rectifier, FM-19 (M.D.F.) protectors and 20 pair terminal blocks, Wire Chief's Test Set BE-70 and adjacent thereto on the side wall of the van, the modified BD-90 Power Panel.

Similar installations were made to house a Two Position TC-2 Telephone Central Office Set.

75. Meanwhile negotiations with AFHQ had been under way with the object of expediting the transfer from ITALY to FRANCE of certain heavy Field artillery units which were on the approved DRAGOON troop list but which continued to support the forces in ITALY for a time because it was believed that they would not be needed in the early stages of the invasion of Southern FRANCE. AFHQ appeared reluctant to turn over these units, but the net result of the negotiations was an agreement to load the 698 FA Bn, 240 mm Howitzer, plus 2 Sections 575 FA Bn, 8 inch gun, and the 697 FA Bn, 240 mm Howitzer, plus 2 Sections 575 FA Bn, 8 inch gun, at LEGHORN, ITALY on 22 October for shipment to Southern FRANCE where its assignment would change from Fifth to Seventh Army. (43) Due to prior decisions on a high level no further augmentation of heavy artillery from the Mediterranean Theater could be hoped for, at least during continuance of the campaign in ITALY.

76. The total amount of heavy Field Artillery in view was far below the amount necessary to give proper support to powerful and sustained attacks by both the Seventh Army and the First French Army simultaneously. The need for heavy artillery was the greater in view of the difficult offensive mission of Sixth Army Group, the subnormal proportion of 155 guns and the fact that the 79th Division had been continuously in action since 6 June and the VI Corps since 15 August. It is true that during the first half of October the limiting factor in artillery support was not so much a matter of guns as the limited capacity for ammunition transport of the five hundred mile supply line from the coast. However every effort was made to secure as nearly as possible a normal complement of artillery against the day when the problem of ammunition supply should be solved.

77. Soon after arrival at VITTEL a Statistical Division was established to collect and correlate statistical data of current interest, and to maintain it for ready reference of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. (44)

78. On 4 October General Devers, accompanied by General Barr, left for PARIS to attend a Commanders' conference held at SHAEF (Forward) in VER-SAILLES the following day. (Discussions and decisions are too highly classified for release at this time). General Devers and General Barr returned to VITTEL on 6 October. Meanwhile General Sawbridge, G-1, and selected members of the Sixth Army Group Staff attended other conferences at VER-SAILLES on the subject of the disarmament of the German Army.

79. On 6 October it was learned that the 44th Infantry Division had been selected by General Bradley for transfer to the Sixth Army Group. (45)

80. The progressive augmentation of the Sixth Army Group far beyond the scope of the original DRAGOON troop list naturally called for a corresponding augmentation of service units. To expedite the availability of these necessary units General Devers was willing to inactivate certain NATOUSA anti-aircraft units and convert them into service units. Finding this project impeded by administrative delays General Devers on 6 October cabled the War Department urging prompt approval of the necessary actions involved. (46)

81. Under date of 8 October a letter was published with subject, "Functions of Headquarters, Sixth Army Group". It followed in general the preliminary G-3 study outlined in Chapter One, but differed from it in some respects and was in greater detail. (47)

82. Also on 8 October General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, arrived at the airfield six miles from VITTEL. He was accompanied by Lieutenant General Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division (OPD) and Colonel Frank McCarthy, Secretary of the War Department General Staff. General Devers, General Tupper and General Jenkins met General Marshall's group on their arrival and all flew to LUXEUIL, location of Headquarters II Corps (French). A U.S. fighter escort furnished protection on this flight. The party was met by General de Lattre, commanding the First French Army, and Lieutenant General de Goislard de Montsabert, commanding the II French Corps. They were conducted to the Corps headquarters where appropriate military honors were rendered. These included a guard of honor and military music including the National Anthems of FRANCE and the UNITED STATES. The French Minister of War, Monsieur Andre' Diethelm, joined the party at the headquarters. The French commanders explained to General Marshall the tactical situation of their commands and General de Lattre also outlined his logistical problems. After luncheon and with appropriate ceremony, General Marshall, General Devers and their respective groups left for the airfield accompanied by General de Lattre. On the return flight to VITTEL air cover was provided by French fliers in Spitfires. Beginning about 1915 hours a forty-five minute conference was held in the War Room. The G-2, G-3 and G-4 situations, Sixth Army Group, were explained to General Marshall by the corresponding staff section chiefs. In addition, the general military situation in EUROPE including the French, Italian and Eastern fronts were reviewed briefly. General Marshall then explained the current situation in the Far East with particular attention to the situation in China and the campaign plans for recapture of the PHILIPPINES.

83. The following morning General Marshall and his party accompanied by General Devers, General Tupper and General Jenkins drove to Headquarters Seventh Army at EPINAL where they were received by the army commander, General Patch. After introducing his staff to General Marshall, General Patch conducted the group to Headquarters VI Corps at POUXEUX. Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Corps Commander, introduced his staff and gave General Marshall a complete picture of his current situation and future plans. He then conducted the party to each of his three division command posts in turn. They were the 3rd Division under Major General John W. O'Daniel, the 36th Division under Major General John E. Dahlquist and the 45th Division under Major General William W. Eagles. In each case members of the division staff were introduced and the local situation explained. In the zone of action of the 36th Division, General Marshall, accompanied by General Devers, General Handy and General Truscott, visited a regimental command post. General Truscott remained with the party until it reached the VI Corps boundary en route to LUNEVILLE.

84. Reaching LUNEVILLE the party visited Headquarters XV Corps where the Corps Commander, Major General Wade H. Haislip received them, introduced his staff and then, in the operations room, explained the current situation on his front, his mission and his plan of action. General Haislip provided lunch after which he conducted four members of the party, General Marshall, General Devers, General Tupper and General Jenkins forward to the Advance Command Post of the 79th Division. This trip was made in jeeps because of road conditions and proximity to the front. Major General Ira T. Wyche, Division Commander, brought the visitors into the dug-out that served as his C.P. and was located in a forest through which elements of the division were then attacking. General Wyche started to explain the attack from the

combined situation map but to a considerable degree the explanation was made by the map itself as lines and markers were adjusted in conformity with the flow of information, principally by telephone, to G-2 and G-3. After spending half an hour at this C.P. the party left for LUNEVILLE.

85. The road passed 105mm and 155mm Howitzer battery positions and General Marshall stopped for brief conversation with enlisted men. When a section commander was asked how much ammunition he had on hand, instead of consulting records he answered at once from memory "Six rounds of this, eight of that, five of the other and so on going through the various types of shell and fuses". Types were many but the quantity very small, so General Haislip asked for the total number of rounds fired in action by his gun to date, "Two thousand one hundred and eighty-five rounds, Sir", came the answer without an instant's hesitation. It appeared that while all batteries had small amounts of ammunition on hand the reserves were at the lowest level of their history. The party also passed through the area of the 2nd French Armored Division and on reaching LUNEVILLE found its commander General Jacques Leclerc, waiting at XV Corps Headquarters. General Marshall talked at some length with General Leclerc and complimented him highly on the fine work of his division since its landing in FRANCE.

86. Meanwhile during General Marshall's absence from LUNEVILLE that town was the target of heavy shelling by various caliber up to 150mm, and members of the party who had remained there had to put into practice their best technique of taking cover. When General Haislip learned of this, there could be detected in his bearing a certain anxiety and concern. As host he was reluctant to show his distinguished guest the door, and yet he was very insistent that the cars and all else be in readiness so that as soon as General Marshall was ready to leave, no instant of delay could be chargeable to XV Corps arrangements. Fortunately the entire party moved out toward NANCY shortly before the next bombardment hit LUNEVILLE. They were joined by a Third Army escort headed by Deputy Chief of Staff XII Corps. General Patch and his party left the convoy at the North boundary of Seventh Army. Arriving at Headquarters XII Corps in NANCY the party was met by the Corps Commander, Major General Manton S. Eddy and his assembled staff. After exchange of greetings by the generals and appropriate staff introductions General Devers and his group returned to VITTEL. (48)

87. Sixth Army Group had provided a helmet for the use of the Chief of Staff. It had four stars neatly painted across the front but Colonel McCarthy, habitual travelling companion of General Marshall, shook his head dubiously saying, "I've never seen him wear one of those things yet". The General was in fact reluctant but, when General Truscott said he would feel much better if he would wear it in the forward zone, he gave it a trial and presently remarked that it was the first helmet he had ever put on his head that was anywhere near a fit. When General Devers and his party left NANCY, General Marshall made a point of keeping the helmet. It is not known whether this unprecedented action was because of the four stars, the perfect fit, or the well known and invariable practice of General George S. Patton, Jr., to collect a fine of fifty dollars from any officer who ventured inside the Third Army area without a helmet.

88. About 8 October the Commanding General Sixth Army Group was asked whether or not he desired the 10th Division, (Light), to augment his forces.

However inquiry brought a War Department reply to the effect that there was a requirement for a light division in PACIFIC areas and that the 10th Light Division would (in all probability) eventually be employed there. The reply further indicated that in any event this division could not be made operational in FRANCE before March 1945, largely because of the animal transport ships required. (49) The offer was declined on 11 October in view of logistical considerations and lateness of arrival of animals.

89. The necessity for conducting winter operations under heavy snow conditions had been foreseen and, in this connection during the month of October, the disposition of the First Special Service Force was under discussion through the medium of about a dozen cables between Sixth Army Group, SHAEF and the War Department. Realization that the 10th Light Division would be unavailable greatly increased the urgency of retaining the First Special Service Force. This force, trained for mountain and winter operations, was a part of the First Airborne Task Force which was being relieved from the line with a view to reassignment, reorganization or disbanding of its components. The First Special Service Force included Canadian personnel to the extent of some 45 officers and 642 enlisted men and it was recommended that these be withdrawn by SHAEF and shipped to Northern FRANCE for employment with the Canadian Army. It was further recommended that the U.S. personnel augmented by that of the 552nd Infantry Anti-tank Company, (which was on the Seventh Army troop list), be reorganized into a separate infantry regiment under T/O 7-11 and assigned to the Seventh Army for use in special operations. The War Department suggested that if an infantry regiment was to be formed from First Special Service personnel, the 99th Battalion be incorporated to help fill it to strength. However, SHAEF pointed out that because of its specialized training the 99th Battalion was earmarked for operations elsewhere. Sixth Army Group views on the matter as of 23 October are well summarized in a message of that date citing the need for such a unit to operate successively in the Alps along the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier, the VOSGES Mountains and the Black Forest in winter snows. (51)

90. About 9 October the 442nd Infantry Regiment with the necessary attached units to form a combat team was moved by motor transport from the coastal area to the Seventh Army zone. This unit was on the original DRAGOON troop list and its personnel were of Japanese descent. It included the 100th Infantry Battalion which had served with distinction in ITALY and had received a Presidential battle award. The regiment was attached to the VI Corps and placed in the line with the 36th Division.

91. On 10 October the organization of a Joint Planning Staff was announced. It was headed by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and included representatives of G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and Air. (52)

92. On the morning of 11 October the Brazilian Minister of War, Enrico C. Dutra, made awards and presented medals to General Devers and to General Barr. General Devers was made "Grand Officer, Order of Military Merit" and General Barr was made "Commander" of the same order. The presentation was made at the headquarters at VITTEL with appropriate ceremony including a guard of honor. The Brazilian Government does not provide written citations for this award, but the presentation speech indicated that the awards were made for outstandingly meritorious service during the fighting in ITALY and most valuable assistance to the First Brazilian Expeditionary Force incident to its entry into ITALY and participation in the Italian campaign. (40)(78)



93. That evening General Devers talked informally to the assembled officers of his headquarters. He outlined the advantages of a relatively small mobile headquarters in one place rather than a large one organized in echelons. He urged the group to keep in mind that the liquidation of opposing enemy forces was our primary mission and the objective toward which all activity should be directed. He said he had noted a cheerful, helpful attitude generally throughout the headquarters and wanted this continued, stressing that it was our function to help those laboring in the zone of communications as well as to aid the troops in front. He disclosed that General Marshall had expressed satisfaction with what he saw, both at the headquarters and in our forward areas. The difficult supply situation was mentioned hopefully as being in line for early improvement. With regard to appearance and conduct, General Devers stressed adherence to the generally accepted standards for officers and gentlemen rather than the publication of voluminous detailed regulations. Immediately following his talk the Army Group Commander presented awards as listed below. The accompanying citations were read to the assembly.

Major General Ben M. Sawbridge	Distinguished Service Medal
Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Chapman	Legion of Merit
First Lieutenant Sidney Reisberg	Bronze Star Medal


94. Toward the middle of October the health and morale of combat troops and headquarters personnel received a great boost by virtue of the issue of excellent fresh meats.

95. On 13 October ETOUSA orders were issued transferring General Truscott from Sixth Army Group to Twelfth Army Group effective on or about 20 October, and transferring Major General Edward H. Brooks, USA, from Twelfth Army Group to Sixth Army Group. This action effected change of command of the VI Corps of the Seventh Army. (53)

96. Also on this date there was published "Amendment No. 1 to Letter of Instructions Number One, dated 26 September 1944", addressed to the Commanding Generals of the First French Army, Seventh Army and First Airborne Task Force. The main purpose of this amendment was to effect the relief of the latter force then charged with protection of the right flank generally along the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border, so that it might again become prepared and available for the type of operation for which it was organized and trained. The First French Army was directed to effect the relief of the First Airborne Task Force and all its attached units, the relief to be completed by 1200 A hours, 10 November 1944, and was given the additional mission of taking over the protection of the right flank along the FRANCO-ITALIAN Border from SWITZERLAND to the MEDITERRANEAN. Upon relief, the First Airborne Task Force was to revert to Sixth Army Group Reserve in an assembly area to be selected, except that the First Special Service Force, which was a part of the task force, was given the vicinity of AIX - EN - PROVENCE for its assembly area. Supply plans including priorities were added. (54)

97. On 16 October General Devers went to BESANCON where he, in company with General de Lattre, reviewed a detachment of French and U.S. troops prior to their "Parade in Arms" and awarded to General de Lattre the degree of Commander, Legion of Merit as a part of the ceremony. (55)

98. On 17 October the establishment of a Liaison Section headed by



Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Lodge, Jr., was announced. Endowed with personnel having exceptional command of the French language it was used chiefly for liaison with General de Lattre and his First French Army. (56)(57) A list of liaison officers from other headquarters with their functions was published two days later. (58)

99. Plans for the transfer of administrative responsibility in Southern FRANCE from NATOUSA to SHAEF are explained in message from NATOUSA to AGWAR (War Department.) dated 17 October 1944:

Effective 0001A 01 November all NATOUSA units and personnel in FRANCE will be transferred to ETOUSA in accordance with your message of 17 September.

Responsibilities in Southern FRANCE pertaining to following services will be transferred at the same hour: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal General, Judge Advocate General, Inspector General, Fiscal, Chaplain, Replacement Command, Information and Education, Special Service (less supply).

Supply of replacements to SOUTHERN FRANCE by NATOUSA has now been discontinued and SHAEF has assumed that responsibility. We continue to ship return to units personnel to DRAGOON units from hospitals in ITALY. Recommendations of NATOUSA as to revised Theater replacement levels will be submitted separately. No date has been set for transfer of responsibility for supply.

NATOUSA retains operational control of supply installations, personnel and units pertaining to DELTA BASE and CONBASE. COMZONE NATOUSA Advance Headquarters has been set up in FRANCE to control these activities but on 01 November will not be transferred to ETOUSA. (59)

Revision of the boundary between NATO and ETO is covered in a War Department message dated 18 September 1944. (60)

100. On 19 October there was issued a revised Manning Table and allotment of grades to the Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Special Troops, Sixth Army Group. Indicated totals were 208 Officers, 15 Warrant Officers and 695 Enlisted Men, an aggregate of 918. (61)

101. On 20 October the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) under command of Major General Ralph Royce was established with headquarters at VITTEL. (62) Its primary mission was to support units of the Sixth Army Group. (63)


102. On 22 October General Devers turned over the Command of NATOUSA to Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney who had been serving as Deputy Chief of Staff United States Army. (64) At the same time General Devers assignment was changed to Sixth Army Group. (65) While he had been commanding this army group since its activation, his status had been "attached".

103. On 23 October a revision of the rear boundaries of First French Army and Seventh Army was announced. (66)

104. On 24 October Colonel Vittrup, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

SIXTH ARMY GROUP SITUATION MAP


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
Looking East from behind our lines of 26 October (indicated by white string).

Pins without string indicate SIEGFRIED defenses along East bank of RHINE from SWISS Frontier to vicinity of KARLSRUHE and then turning sharply to the West. Density of pins indicates density of fortifications.

N



From right to left: Mountains of SWITZERLAND, BELFORT GAP, VOSGES, SAVERNE GAP, SIEGFRIED LINE. Beyond the RHINE VALLEY (Center) are the mountains of the BLACK FOREST.



(Troops) went to SHAEF to straighten out troop and equipment problems resulting from the use by General de Lattre of 52,000 members of the F.F.I. to augment the First French Army and his equipping them from maintenance stocks (U.S. Types) at his disposal. It was necessary either to secure special authorization for replacement of the maintenance stocks thus diverted, or to employ the F.F.I. personnel in regular units on an approved troop list. The decision was, first, to use 15,000 F.F.I. troops to replace Senegalese units of the 1st DMI and the 9th DIC, the Senegalese, unsuitable for cold weather operations, to turn in their weapons which were U.S. types; second, to organize 19,000 F.F.I. into 24 light infantry battalions (without heavy weapons companies) to be used as relief units or as otherwise expedient, and to be equipped from British stocks already accumulated for the use of liberated man-power; third, to use 6,000 F.F.I. to organize one infantry regiment and three armored battalions, their equipment to be drawn from unused allocations to the French Rearmament Program; and finally the remaining 12,000 to be absorbed as replacements in existing units.

105. On 24 October Administrative Instructions Number 1 were published covering generally the subjects of Administration and Supply. (67)

106. On 22 October the 44th Division was attached to Seventh Army for supply and on the 25th took over responsibility in the zone of the 79th Division, XV Corps. The relief was effected by stages and the 79th Division withdrew to an area Southwest of LUNEVILLE. After being in action since 6 June, a period of more than four and one-half months, this hard working division was to have but a few days respite. (68)

107. On the same date General Devers presented to Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U.S. Navy, an Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal for his outstanding service and achievements as commander of the Naval forces taking part in the invasion of Southern FRANCE. The presentation was made at Sixth Army Group Headquarters with appropriate ceremony including a guard of honor and the reading of the citation. (69)

108. About 24 October there was dispatched to the Commanding General Seventh Army a letter with subject "Conception of Military Government". This letter stressed the difference between Military Government of occupied German territory and the conduct of Civil Affairs operations in liberated areas of FRANCE. (70) Also at this time there was sent to both Seventh Army and First French Army an "Interim Directive on Military Government in Germany". This is an important and rather detailed document. Because of its length of more than seventy pages, including annexes, only its most essential portions are included in the document file. (71) The G-5 Historian maintained a current detailed history of the section which was submitted periodically to G-5, SHAEF.

109. It is characteristic of World War II that, because of the several active theaters and extended fronts, divisions were kept in the line without relief for much longer periods than was desirable or was the practice in World War I. This was particularly hard on the Infantry regiments and resulted in serious decline in their combat effectiveness. In an effort to alleviate this situation General Jenkins on 25 October conferred with Major General Harold R. Bull, G-3, SHAEF, with a view to the early shipment of the nine Infantry regiments of the 42nd, 63rd and 70th Divisions from the United States through the Port of MARSEILLES for assignment to Sixth Army

Group. The situation relative to heavy equipment was such that it was possible to ship the Infantry regiments from the United States much earlier than the other elements of the divisions. Sixth Army Group requested arrival as soon as possible after 7 November. (72) The War Department scheduled arrival during the period 6 to 8 December. (73) It was hoped that the attachment of at least one extra regiment to each division of the Sixth Army Group would make possible the relief and rehabilitation of the regiments on some such basis as 3 weeks in the lines followed by a week of rest and reorganization.

110. The 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions and the Advance Detachment of the 14th Armored Division, all destined for employment in the Sixth Army Group, had arrived at the staging area near MARSEILLES by 25 October.

111. On 29 October there was received a directive from SHAEF (SCAF No 114)(74) and on 2 November an amendment thereto (SCAF 118)(75). For clarity the directive with the two amended paragraphs substituted therein is paraphrased below:

FROM: SHAEF MAIN SIGNED EISENHOWER

TO : PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS 28 October 1944

1. The directives of 4 September and 25 September are now cancelled and superseded by this directive.

2. Since my last directive, of 4 September, the enemy has continued to reinforce his forces in the West. Present indications are that he intends to make the strongest possible stand on the West Wall, in the hope of denying us access to Germany.

3. The (EFISOGED?) positions indicate his concern to protect the SAAR and the RUHR. It is in front of these areas, and particularly the RUHR, that his main concentrations are found. He is also sensitive to a threat against the BELFORT approaches to the Upper RHINE Valley.

4. Limitations of transportation and maintenance prevented our over-running the SIEGFRIED Line before the enemy's resistance stiffened. We have now to deploy superior forces in the forward area and furnish them adequate means for intensive fighting. These forces cannot be maintained effectively during the winter months without using the Port of ANTWERP. Consequently the securing and placing in operation of that port is our most important immediate objective.

5. My intention continues to be the destruction of the enemy.

6. The general plan, subject to prior capture of the ANTWERP approaches is:

.. A. To defeat decisively the enemy west of the RHINE, making the main effort in the North, and secure bridgeheads over the RHINE; then to seize the RUHR and, later, advance deep into Germany.

B. To conduct operations to destroy the enemy in the SAAR, secure crossings over the RHINE, and prepare for an advance from the SAAR, at a later date, in accordance with the situation at that time. These operations are to be so timed as best to support the main effort to which they are subsidiary.

C. On the right (southern) flank to act aggressively with the object, initially, of overwhelming the enemy west of the RHINE and, later, of advancing into GERMANY. Full use will be made of the maintenance resources available from the MEDITERRANEAN.

7. These operations are divided into 3 general phases which will, however, overlap.

FIRST PHASE: The battle west of the RHINE, taking advantage of opportunities to seize bridgeheads.

SECOND PHASE: Operations leading to the capture of bridgeheads over the RHINE and deployment of our forces on the east bank thereof.

THIRD PHASE: The advance beyond the RHINE.

The missions covered in subsequent paragraphs are confined to the first 2 phases..

8. The missions of the Northern Group of Armies are:

FIRST PHASE:

A. To open the port of ANTWERP as first priority.

B. When operations to open ANTWERP have been completed to attack the enemy west of the MEUSE and advance to the RHINE, this in conjunction with the operation of the Central Group of Armies north of the ARDENNES. Target date for this attack is November 10.

SECOND PHASE:

C. To seize bridgeheads, in its zone, over the RHINE and the IJSEL and deploy in strength east of these two rivers. CINC Northern Group of Armies will decide upon the extent to which Western HOLLAND will have to be cleared of the enemy. This decision will be based not upon

political considerations but on military factors.

9. The mission of the Central Group of Armies is:

North of the ARDENNES.

FIRST PHASE:

A. To advance to the RHINE, destroy enemy forces west thereof and gain bridgeheads south of COLOGNE. Target date for this attack is 10 November.

SECOND PHASE:

B. To seize bridgeheads, in its zone, over the RHINE and deploy in strength on the east bank.

South of the ARDENNES.

C. To occupy the SAAR and secure crossings over the RHINE. These operations will be timed so as to assist the main effort in the north most effectively.

10. The mission of the Southern Group of Armies during the first two phases:

A. To advance in its zone, secure a crossing and deploy in strength across the RHINE.

B. To protect the southern (right) flank of the Central Group of Armies. This will entail denying the area LUNEVILLE to the enemy initially.

11. During the first phase, the present boundary between Northern and Central Groups of Armies remains effective initially and is to be changed as required by the tactical situation by agreement between the Army Group Commanders, who will maintain constant and close contact. On completion of first phase, forces will be regrouped and will carry out necessary reliefs, by mutual arrangement between Commanders in Chief concerned, to give effect to the following boundaries which will be subject to adjustment in detail between the Army Group Commanders:

A. Between Central and Northern Group of Armies:

BRUSSELS-LOUVAIN-DIEST (to Northern Group)-HASSELT-HECHTEL-WEERT (to Central Group)-VENRAIJ-GOCH-EMMERICH (to Northern Group)-BOCHOLT-COESFELD-MUNSTER (to Central Group).

B. Between Southern and Central Groups of Armies:

AUXERRE (to Central Group)-CHAUMONT-LUNEVILLE-
SARREBOURG-BITCHE-FIRMASENS-NEUSTADT-MANNHEIM (to South-
ern Group).

12. Allied Air and Naval Forces will continue the support of Ground Forces under current directives.

13. The First Allied Airborne Army will be prepared to participate in major operations in the advance into GERMANY after supporting the Central Group of Armies in the crossing of the RHINE.

112. Toward the end of October it appeared desirable to provide further direction and coordination for the action of the armies. Enemy strength in our front was estimated as inferior to ours and his attitude and intentions as generally defensive. There were indications of gradual shift from "Offensive defense" to "static or delaying defense". (76) Both the situation and the SHAEF directive of 28 October (SCAF 114) called for a continuation of the offensive. The principal choice of plans concerned location of the main effort. Should it be by the First French Army on the South or the Seventh Army on the North? Missions assigned by SCAF included protection of the right (South) flank of Twelfth Army Group. In the zone of the Seventh Army the avenues of advance, while anything but avenues, appeared not quite so difficult as those available to the French. Objectives in the Seventh Army zone were more remunerative than those of the French. Weakening of the First French Army by diversion of two divisions for the BORDEAUX operation (INDEPENDENCE) was a factor. While a successful turning of the enemy left (south) flank would have desirable results, the proximity of the Swiss Border and the strong fortress area of BELFORT restricted the maneuver room needed for such an operation. Details of the plan adopted are covered in Letter of Instructions Number Two, quoted below:

28 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : First French Army.
Seventh Army.
First Airborne Task Force.

1. a. See current intelligence summary.
- b. Twenty First Army Group is clearing the enemy from West of the MEUSE in the VENLO area and from the sea approaches to ANTWERP. Upon completion, it will attack Southward between the RHINE and MEUSE.
- c. Twelfth Army Group is regrouping, upon completion of which it advances to the RHINE with all three armies. Target date later.

2. Sixth Army Group continues the offensive, destroys the enemy in zone and advances to the RHINE; first phase, capture of STRASBOURG and clearing the area West of the RHINE. Directive (see x (6)) for subsequent phases will issue later. Sixth Army Group will protect the South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

BOUNDARIES: (77)

3. a. First French Army.

- (1) Continue current operations. No later than 1 November launch strong effort on the left, passing to the South of GERARDMER, and assist Seventh Army in capture of high ground along army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER, coordinating with Seventh Army.
- (2) On D day (see x (1)) exert maximum pressure along entire front and hold enemy in position; launch strong attack in an effort to breach BELFORT GAP and destroy enemy in zone.
- (3) Protect South flank of Seventh Army and South flank of Sixth Army Group. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

b. Seventh Army.

- (1) Continue current operations. Secure a suitable line of departure not later than 5 November for an all out offensive, capturing in this period the high ground along the army boundary immediately East of GERARDMER. This latter operation will be assisted by First French Army (see 3 a (1)).
- (2) On D day (see x (1)): launch an all out offensive on entire front, with main effort on general axis EPINAL - STRASBOURG; capture STRASBOURG and destroy enemy in zone West of the RHINE.
- (3) Protect South flank of Twelfth Army Group.

c. First Airborne Task Force. Protect flank along Franco-Italian border in currently assigned sector.

d. Air.

- (1) In support of this operation, air operations are being conducted against RHINE river communications targets as 1st priority and against enemy installations and communications between the RHINE and the

front line as 2nd priority.

(2) On or about D day and thereafter maximum close support will be given to the main effort of the advance as 1st priority and continuation of interdiction on the RHINE, and between the RHINE and the front lines in 2nd priority.

(3) Tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment as required.

x. (1) D day will be announced in separate instructions. H hour will be as prescribed by Army Commanders.

(2) CG First French Army will be responsible for coordination of his effort against high ground East of GER-ARDMERE with the CG of Seventh Army.

(3) Army Commanders will submit their outline plans for the D day attack to this headquarters not later than 4 November.

(4) Lateral contact will be established and maintained as mutually agreed by Army Commanders.

(5) CG Seventh Army will arrange with CG First French Army for suitable French participation in capture of STRASBOURG.

(6) Armies will exploit promptly any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the RHINE or breach the WESTWALL without waiting for instructions.

4. No change in current Administrative Instructions.

5. No change in current Signal Instructions.

By Command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

DAVID G. BARR,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

REUBEN E. JENKINS,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

113. Sixth Army Group still lacked the quantity of heavy artillery needed for proper support of concurrent attacks by its two armies.

The guns available were spread thin and divided between the armies in accordance with frontages of attack and forces involved. Concurrent attack was in line with the SHAEF directive and its advantages appeared to outweigh those to be gained by successive army attacks, each with full support of all the heavy artillery available to the Sixth Army Group.

SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SITUATION MAP

28 OCT. 1944

REFERENCES

SECTION II

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
1.		Cable, MARSHALL to DEVERS discussing the situation in Europe and outlining plans including establishment of Sixth Army Group. (To be included when released)	1.
2.		Oral statement NATOUSA Historian, Major E. D. Salmon, 22 October 1944.	
3.	8 June 44	Cable, ALEXANDER to WILSON, AFHQ, appreciation of the situation in Italy. (To be included when released)	22.
4.	AFHQ Staff Memo #71 28 July 44	AFHQ Advance Detachment will open at BASTIA, CORSICA 29 July 44. Staff and Signal communications will be on a reduced scale at AFHQ.	2.
5.	AG 322/106 A-0 1 August 44	Letter from NATOUSA to all concerned, Subject: Activation of Sixth Army Group.	3.
6.	AG 322/1(6AG) 27 July 44	A study furnished by G-3, NATOUSA to C/S, AFHQ, Adv. Det., Subject: Functions of a Headquarters Group of Armies.	4.
7.	AG 322/1(6AG) 5 August 44	T/O or Manning Table for Sixth Army Group.	23.
8.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #2 27 August 44	Appointment of Chief of Staff and heads of General and Special Staff Section.	5.
9.	AG 370.5/3 G-0 30 August 44	Letter AFHQ, Adv. Det. to all concerned, Subject: Movement of Hq 6 AG to ST. TROPEZ.	
10.	AG 381-1 3 Sept 44 AG 381-1 3 Sept 44	Cable, WILSON to Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff - rearrangement of Armies. Cable, WILSON to SHAEF, same subject - PATCH not DEVERS in operational command of DRAGOON forces.	6. 6a.
11.	AG 381-1 2 Sept 44	Cable, WILSON to Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff - review of situation in Mediterranean Theater.	7.
12.	4 Sept 44	Cable from EISENHOWER - review of situation and intentions.	8.
13.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #2 5 Sept 44	Establishment of British Increment.	9.
14.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #4 8 Sept 44	Correct designation of Hq Sixth Army Group.	10.

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
15.	370.5/3 C-0 9 Sept 44	Letter Hq 6 AG to all concerned, Subject: Movement of Hq 6 AG to LYON, FRANCE.	11.
16.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #3 9 Sept 44	Assignment of Special Staff Officers.	
17.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #4 11 Sept 44	Assignment of Secretary General Staff.	21.
18.		Units commanded by General FREDERICK.	12.
19.	AG 370.5-10 (Gen) 14 Sept 44	Cable, SACMED directing Hq 6 AG to begin operational control on 15 Sept 44.	13.
20.	AG 322-4 (ACC) 14 Sept 44	Cable, SACMED transferring civil affairs responsibility of Southern FRANCE to CG 6 AG 0001B hours 15 Sept, formerly AFHQ responsibility.	
21.	Hq 6 AG Operational Memo #1	B-1, 15 Sept 44, Appendix "A" of Operational Memo #1.	14.
22.	Amend #1 Operational Memo #1	Changes in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 issued on 20 Sept 44.	15.
23.	Hq 6 AG Memo 18 Sept 44	Roster of Staff Officers of French Army "B".	16.
24.	AG 381-10 16 Sept 44	Cable, SHAEF to 6 AG - Boundaries of Armies.	17.
25.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #6 17 Sept Hq 6 AG G.O. #5 23 Sept 44	Arrival of French Mission and Appointment of Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Appointment of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.	
26.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #6 26 Sept 44	Appointment of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.	
27.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #7 27 Sept 44	Assignment of Public Relations Officer.	
28.	AG 400.34/106 -0 7 August 44	Letter NATOUSA to CG, SOS, NATOUSA, APO 750, Subject: Equipment for Sixth Army Group.	20.

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
29.	Hq 6 AG Bulletin 20 Sept 44	Decoration of Personnel.	
30.	Hq 6 AG Memo 20 Sept 44	Revised Manning Table, Sixth Army Group.	24.
31.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #9 23 Sept	Staff Procedure for Headquarters Sixth Army Group.	25.
32.	AG 370-6 25 Sept 44	Message to SHAEF - Transfer of XV Corps to Sixth Army Group.	26.
33.	AG 370.5-13 (Gen) 23 Sept 44	Message SHAEF to 6 AG - Proposal of alternative transfer of III Corps, 95th Div. and 2 French Armored Div.	27.
34.	AG 370-6 25 Sept 44	Message to SHAEF - Preference of transfer of XV Corps as Alternative A.	28.
35.	Hq 6 AG Operational Memo #2	Establishment of 1st AB Task Force as a separate command. Dated 24 Sept 44.	29.
36.	Hq 6 AG Ltr of Instr. #1	Letter of Instructions Number One 25 Sept 44.	30.
37.		Oral statement Colonel Heath, G-3, Artillery 15 Nov 44.	
38.	AG 370.5/31 SGS -O 30 Sept. 44	Letter Hq 6 AG to all concerned, Subject: Movement of Hq 6 AG from LYON to VITTEL, FRANCE.	
39.	AG 370.5-16 (Gen) 29 Sept 44	Message SHAEF to 6 AG - Units attached to Sixth Army Group.	31.
40.		Personal observations of the author.	
41.	AG 370-6 7 Oct 44	Message to 12 AG - Need for artillery units.	32.
42.	AG 370-6 10 Oct 44	Message 12 AG to 6 AG - Retain 999 FA Bn., 772 FA Bn., 529 Eng Co., 23 Gp Hq.	33.
43.	AG 370.5-3 (Gen) 8 Oct 44 AG 370.5-3 (Gen) 9 Oct 44	Message AFHQ to AAI Main - Transfer of FA Bns. to 7th Army 22 Oct 44. Message AAI Main to 5th Army - Transfer of FA Battalions.	34.
44.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #16 9 Oct	Statistical Division established in office of Chief of Staff.	

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
45.	AG 370.5-37 6 Oct 44	Message 12 AG to SHAEF - Transfer of 44th Inf Div to Sixth Army Group.	35.
46.	AG 32.2-2 6 Oct 44	Message NATOUSA to AGWAR - Service units for Sixth Army Group.	36.
47.	AG 322/1 - 0 8 Oct 44	Letter Hq 6 AG to all concerned, Subject: Functions of Hq Sixth Army Gp.	37.
48.		Oral statement of General R. E. Jenkins	
49.	9 Oct 44	Message AGWAR to ETOUSA - 10th Light Division.	38.
50.	AG 370.5-45 11 Oct 44	Message to SHAEF - No requirement for 10th Light Division.	
51.	AG 320.2-1 23 Oct 44	Message to SHAEF - First Special Service Force be reorganized as Inf Regt.	39.
52.	Hq 6 AG Staff. Memo #17 10 Oct	Organization of Joint Planning Staff, Sixth Army Group.	40.
53.	AG 300.4 (13 Oct 1944) L-686	Subject Orders - Hq ETOUSA 13 Oct 44 Transfer of Generals Truscott and Brooks, change of command of VI Corps.	
54.	Amend #1 Ltr. of Instr #1	Letter Hq 6 AG 13 Oct 44 to CG's 1st French Army, 7th Army, 1st ABTF - Relief of 1st ABTF.	41.
55.	Parade in Arms 16 Oct 44	Decoration of General de Lattre in Besancon.	42.
56.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #19 17 Oct	Establishment of Liaison Section this Headquarters.	
57.	Hq 6 AG G.O. #8 17 Oct 44	Assignment of Special Staff.	
58.	Hq 6 AG Staff Memo #22 20 Oct	Liaison Officers from other Headquarters.	43.
59.	AG 300-1 17 Oct 44	Message NATOUSA to AGWAR - Transfer of personnel to ETOUSA from NATOUSA.	
60.	18 Sept 44	Message AGWAR to ETOUSA - Reference to boundaries.	44.

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
61.	AG 322/1 A-0 19 Oct 44	Letter Hq 6 AG to all concerned - Allotment of Grades to Hq, Hq Co. & Special Troops, Sixth Army Group.	45.
62.	Hq USSAFE G.O. #81 20 Oct 44	Establishment of First Tactical Air Force (Prov) with Hq at VITTEL.	46.
63.	Hq 1st TAC(Prov) Ltr of Instr #2	Mission of 1st TAC(Prov) to support units of Sixth Army Group.	
64.	AG 210.311-1 23 Oct 44	Message NATOUSA to AGWAR - Assumption of command of NATOUSA by Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney.	
65.	AG 201 (Devers) 24 Oct 44	Message NATOUSA to 6 AG - Assignment of General Devers to 6 AG effective 22 Oct 44.	
66.	Hq 6 AG Adm Ltr #1 22 Oct 44	Rear boundaries of Armies effective 0001A hours 23 Oct 44.	47.
67.	Hq 6 AG Adm Instr #1 24 Oct 44	Administration and Supply.	48.
68.		G-3 briefing at conference 25 Oct 44.	
69.	Hq 6 AG Bulletin 25 Oct 44	Decoration of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.	
70.	AG 322/6 (ACC) E-0 24 Oct 44	Letter Hq 6 AG to CG 7th Army - Conception of Military Government.	
71.	AG 322/6 (ACC) E-0 21 Oct 44	Letter Hq 6 AG to CG's 7th & 1st French Army - Interim Directive on Military Government in GERMANY.	49.
72.	AG 370.5-3 (Gen) 30 Oct 44	Message to SHAEF - 9 Infantry Regiments to be sent to Sixth Army Group.	50.
73.	AG 370.5-3 (Gen) 2 Nov 44	Message SHAEF to 6 AG - 9 Inf Regts arrive Marseilles 6-8 Dec 44.	51.
74.	AG 381-10 28 Oct 44	Message from SHAEF - Antwerp and Siegfried Line offensives.	52.
75.	AG 381-10 2 Nov 44	Message from SHAEF - Amendment of para 8-9 in message in Ref. 74.	
76.	Hq 6 AG 28 Oct 44	Weekly Intelligence Summary #6	53.

REF NO.	FILE NO.	BRIEF DESCRIPTION	DOC NO.
77.	Hq. 6 AG Ltr of Instr #2 28 Oct	Extract of Letter of Instructions Num- ber Two, Paragraph 2, Boundaries.	54.
78.	AG 200.6-4 11 Oct 44	Message to NATOUSA - Presentation of awards by Brazilian Minister of War Enrico G. Dutra to Generals Devers and Barr.	

CHRONOLOGY

SECTION III

DATE

1944

- 14 July General Marshall sends cable to General Devers directing formation of Sixth Army Group.
- 1 August Headquarters Sixth Army Group activated at BASTIA, CORSICA General Devers commanding.
- 15 August D day, DRAGOON, Invasion of Southern FRANCE.
- 31 August Headquarters moves to ST. TROPEZ, FRANCE and opens there same date.
- 10-15 September . . Movement of Headquarters to LYON, FRANCE.
- 15 September Sixth Army Group becomes operational. Includes Seventh Army and French Army "B". SHAEF assumes operational control of all Allied Ground Forces in Southern FRANCE.
- 15-20 September . . Regrouping to place Seventh Army on left. Moderate advance by Seventh Army. French Army "B", henceforth known as First French Army, fighting off counter-attacks along the approaches to BELFORT.
- 29 September Letter of Instructions Number One issued (Dated 26 Sept) includes plans, boundaries and missions. FABTF placed directly under Headquarters Sixth Army Group.
- 29 September XV Corps passed from Twelfth Army Group to Sixth Army Group and assigned to Seventh Army.
- 5 October Headquarters Sixth Army Group closes at LYON and opens at VITTEL, FRANCE.
- 8 October Visit of General Marshall.
- 9 October 442nd Infantry arrives and assigned to VI Corps.
- 13 October General Brooks replaces General Truscott in command of VI Corps.
- 13 October Amendment Number 1 to Letter of Instructions Number One published. Provided for relief of First Airborne Task Force by 10 November.

DATE
1944

25 October. 44th Division recently joined takes over part of
the line in XV Corps.

28 October. Letter of Instructions Number Two issued including
directions for continuation of the offensive.

GLOSSARY

SECTION IV

A

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
 AG Adjutant General
 ACWAR. Adjutant General War Department
 ANVIL. Original plans for invasion of Southern FRANCE

B C

CDN Canadian
 CG Commanding General
 COMZONE. Communications Zone
 CONBASE. Continental Base Section
 CP Command Post
 C/S Chief of Staff

D

DB Division Blindee' (Armored)
 DIA Division Infantry Algerian
 DIC Division Infantry Colonial
 DIM Division Infantry Moroccan
 DMI Division Marche Infantry
 DMM Division Mountain Moroccan
 DRAGOON. Southern FRANCE Invasion Final Plans and Operation
 DUKWS. Amphibious Trucks 6 x 6

E

ETO European Theater of Operations
 ETOUSA European Theater of Operations United States Army

F

FFI French Forces of the Interior
 FFO Western French Forces (Forces Francaises de L'Ouest)

G

G-1 Personnel (General Staff Section)
 G-2 Intelligence
 G-3 Plans and Operations
 G-4 Supply
 G-5 Civil Affairs and Military Government
 GOUM Goumier, a Moroccan volunteer, usually from the high
 Atlas Mountain region
 GSC General Staff Corps

H

HQ Headquarters

I.

IGD Inspector General's Department
INC Information and Censorship

J

JAGD Judge Advocate General's Department

K L

LST Landing Ship, Tank

M

MAAF Mediterranean Allied Air Force
MATAF Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force
MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations United States Army

N

NATO North African Theater of Operations
NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations United States Army

O

OPD Operations Division

P.

PRO Public Relations Office

Q R S

SACMED Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theater
SCAF Supreme Commander Allied Force
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SOS Services of Supply

T

TABOR A battalion of Goums, strength 891
T/O Table of Organization

U V W X Y Z

WFF Western French Forces (FFO)

X Y Z